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so modified, the judgment is affirmed. Defendants and cross-
complainants Vaughan will recover their costs on appeal. 
Gibson, C. J ., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J ., Carter, J., and 
Traynor, J., concurred. 
SCHAUER, J., Dissenting.-Upon the grounds stated by 
the District Court of Appeal in an opinion authored by the 
late Justice Wilson and concurred in by Presiding Justice 
Moore and Justice McComb (reported at 237 P.2d 53) I 
would reverse the judgment. 
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied August 
7, 1952. Schauer, J., was of the opinion that the petition 
should be granted. 
[L. A. No. 22232. In Bank. July 11, 1952.] 
FASCINATION, INCORPORATED (a Corporation), Re-
spondent, v. EDWARD G. HOOVER et al., Appellants. 
[1] License&--Compelling Issuanc&--Evidence.-In mandamus pro-
ceeding to compel city tax collector, chief of police and city 
prosecutor to issue license to petitioner to operate an amuse-
ment game, it is error to admit evidence on the question of 
whether the game is one of skill or chance; the applicant is 
not entitled to a trial de novo on this question since authority 
to decide it is vested in the local administrative officers. 
[2] !d.-Compelling Issuance-Scope of Inquiry.-In mandamus 
proceeding to compel local administrative officers to issue 
license to petitioner to operate an amusement game, the trial 
court is limited to an examination of the matters considered 
and examined by the officers in arriving at their decision; to 
an ascertainment of whether such matters were sufficient to 
justify denY"in:g the license. . 
'[3a, Sb] Administrative Law-Court Review-Hearing-Trial de 
. Novo.-where determinative powers ~e vested in a local ad-
' minlstrative agency and the court finds its decision lacks .. 
[1] See Ca.l.Jur., Licenses, § 58; Am.Jur., M;andamus, § 184 et seq. 
· [3]- See Cal.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, § 233; Am.Jur., Pub-
lic Administrative Law, § 223. 
McK . . Dig .. References: [1] Licenses, § 34(4); [2] Licenses, 
§ .. 34(5); ,'[~] --Adininistrative Law, . § 22; [4] Licenses, § 34(6); 
[5] Administrative Law, § 8. 
July 1952] FAsCINATION, lNo. v. HooVER 
[39 C.2d 260: 246 P.2d 656] 
261 
evidentiary basis, a hearing was denied or it was otherwise 
erroneous, it is proper procedure to remand the case to the 
local agency for further and proper proceedings rather than 
for the court to decide the matter on the merits. 
[ 4] Licenses-Compelling Issuance-Appeal-Prejudicial Error.-
In mandamus proceeding to compel local administrative offi-
cers to issue license to petitioner to operate 8.II: amusement 
game, error in admitting evidence on question of whether 
game is one of skill or chance is prejudicial where it is doubt-
ful whether the evidence in the case sustains the court's find-
ing that the officers had insufficient basis for their denial 
of the license, that the game is one of chance, and where 
the record demonstrates that the court's judgment granting 
the writ was based to a considerable extent on the inadmis-
sible evidence. 
[6] Administrative Law- Proceedings- Notice. and Hearing.-
Where a city ordinance provides that when an application for 
a license is made to the tax collector he must refer it to 
designated officers so that it may be "ascertained" whether 
or not the proposed business would "comply with applicable 
laws and ordinances," it is contemplated that a factual or 
mixed factual and legal determination shall be made by the 
officers which is characteristic in the exercise · of a quasi 
judicial function, and the applicant is entitled to notice and 
hearing of the application so that he may present competent 
evidence for consideration by the officers. 
APPEAL from a. judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Albert F. Ross, Judge.• Reversed. 
Proceeding in mandamus to compel issuance of license to 
conduct an amusement business. Judgment granting writ 
reversed. 
Irving M. Smith, City Attorney (Long Beach), Philip J. 
Brady and John R. Nimocks, Deputy City Attorneys, for 
Appellants. 
Fred N. Howser for Respondent. 
CARTER, J.-Defendants appeal from a. judgment grant-
ing a. writ of mandate commanding them to issue a. license 
to plaintiff, a corporation, to conduct a.n amusement busi-
[5] See Ca.l.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, §§ 1051 116; Am.Jur., 
Public Administrative Law, §§ 119, 134. 
• Assigned by Chairman of Judicial CounciL 
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ness consisting of a game called ''fascination'' in the city 
of Long Beach. Defendants are Hoover, the city tax col-
lector, Dovey, chief of police, and Sutherland, city prose-
cutor. 
There are certain ordinances of the City of Long Beach 
covering the issuance of licenses to operate amusement games 
and other businesses. It appears that before a person may 
engage in business in said city he must obtain a license 
therefor from the city tax collector and pay certain fees; 
if he operates the business without a license he is guilty 
of a misdemeanor. In order to obtain a license he must 
submit with his application "such information as the tax 
collector may reasonably require.'' Under section 6.100 of 
Ordinance C-2232 the collector ''shall thereupon refer suqh 
application to the appropriate departments of the city gov-
ernment in order that it may be ascertained whether or not 
the business proposed to be conducted or the premises in 
which it is proposed to be conducted or the premises in 
which it is proposed to locate such business, will comply with 
applicable laws and ordinances. Upon receipt of written 
notice from such departments that such business and the 
location at which it is proposed to conduct the same will 
so comply, it shall be the duty of the tax collector to pre-
pare and issue a license to the person making application 
therefor upon the payment of the proper fees. In the event 
that a particular department of the city government shall 
reject an application for the reason that such business or 
the location at which it is proposed to conduct the same will 
not so comply with applicable laws and ordinances, the tax 
collector shall not issue such license. If, at the time of mak-
ing application therefor, any money has been paid in excess 
of that required for the expense of conducting an inspection 
by the city, the city council shall, anything herein to the 
contrary notwithstanding, authorize the making of a refund 
to the applicant of such excess, upon receipt from the tax 
collector of information that such application has been re-
jected." 
In compliance with the foregoing ordinance, plaintiff, on 
April 10, 1951, filed an application for a license to conduct 
an amusement business at a specified place and accompanied 
it with a description of the game to be operated. Each 
player is seated at a table and supplied with a ball which 
he endeavors to roll up a slope into holes in the table in 
front of him, with the aim of dropping balls in five holes 
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in a row. The ball then returns to him. The player who 
first achieves that goal is the winner. He receives merchan-
dise, replay coupons or merchandise certificates. 
The chief of police, Dovey, and city prosecutor, Suther-
land, were the appropriate officials to which the application 
should be submitted under section 6.100 to ascertain whether 
the business would violate any law and the tax collector 
submitted plainti1i's application to them. After an investiga-
tion by those officers (further discussed later herein) they 
found and recommended to the tax collector that the game 
would constitute a violation of ''certain sections'' of the 
state Penal Code. Accordingly, the tax collector denied plain-
tiff's application on May 29, 1951. 
Thereafter, plaintiff commenced this action for a writ of 
mandate to compel the issuance of a license to operate the 
business charging that Fascination is a game of skill rather 
than of chance and violates no laws; and that Dovey and 
Sutherland "studied and considered" the game but acted 
arbitrarily and capriciously in denying the application. De-
fendants' answer denied the pertinent allegatiqns of the 
complaint. The trial court found that the game was in-
tended to be one of skill, not chance, and that defendants 
acted arbitrarily, making only a cursory examination of the 
game and without substantial evidence. Accordingly, judg-
ment was entered directing the issuance of the writ and the 
appeal now considered was taken therefrom by defendants. 
At the opening of the trial plainti1i took the position that 
evidence as to whether the game was one of chance or skill 
should be received. Defendants asserted that the only ad-
missible evidence was the extent and nature of the investi-
gation made by them to ascertain whether they had acted 
reasonably and on sufficient grounds in denying the appli-
cation. The court agreed with plaintiff and evidence pro 
and con as to whether the game was one of skill or chance 
was admitted. 
On the issue of the investigation by defendants, Dovey 
testified that plaintiff's secretary, Gibbs, wanted Dovey and 
Sutherland to examine the game on May 3, 1951. They, ac-
companied by Rope, an investigator from Sutherland's office, 
three police officers, and the city electrician, went to where 
the game was being erected. They were there about an hour 
and a half examining the game. Dovey and the others, except 
the electrician, played the game. Dovey rolled 30 balls, the 
others rolled many more. The equipment was inspected. The 
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game was demonstrated by Gibbs and Dovey concluded it 
was a game of chance from "going it" himself and Gibbs' 
statement that he could not successfully operate it with the 
chevron out. (The chevron is a V-shaped protuberance on 
the table immediately in front of the ball receiving holes 
and the ball must be rolled over it.) He tried to make the 
ball go into certain holes. His test as to whether the game 
could be characterized as one of skill or chance depended 
on which predominated. The chevron made it impossible to 
control the course of the ball. The police officers told him 
it was a game of chance. Sutherland testified substantially 
to the same effect and also that he submitted a game exactly 
similar to a university professor. Gibbs testified that at the 
May 3d inspection he told them it was a game of skill; that 
the chevron made it more so ; that by the exercise of skill 
the ball could be made to drop in a chosen hole ; that the 
investigation took less than an hour; that Dovey and Suther-
· land 'rolled the ball seven or eight times; and that he was 
permitted to show them anything he wished about the game. 
As before stated most of the record consists of evidence 
on the question of whether or not the game was one of skill 
or chance. Defendants contend that the admission of that 
evidence was error, their position being that the only evi-
dence admissible was what was done and considered by 
Dovey and Sutherland in determining that question; that 
the :finding that they acted arbitrarily is not supported by 
the evidence ; and that in any event the matter should have 
been remanded to the officers to conduct a further and proper 
investigation if the one had was insufficient. 
[1] Putting aside for the moment the question of whether 
or not a notice ·and hearing in the traditional sense must be 
accorded the applicant for a license, it is clear that it was 
error to admit evidence in the trial court on the question 
of whether the game was one of skill or chance. Whether 
or not a notice and hearing is required, the applicant was 
not entitled to a trial de novo on the question inasmuch 
as we are dealing with a local administrative agency or offi-
cers. The authority to decide the question was vested in 
those officers. [2] The trial court is limited to an exam-
ination of the matters considered and examined by the offi-
cers in arriving at their decision; to an ascertainment of 
whether such matters were slifficient to justify denying the 
license. (Bank of America v. Mundo, 37 Cal.2d 1 [229 P.2d 
345] ; Nishkian v. City of Long Beach, 103 Cal.App.2d 749 
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[230 P.2d 156]; Kaiser Co. v. Reid, 30 Cal.2d 610 [184 P.2d 
879]; Universal Consol. Oil Co. v. Byram, 25 Ca:l.2d 353 
[153 P.2d 746]; Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Co. v. County of 
Los Angeles, 162 Cal. 164 [121 P. 384]; Hammond Lbr. Co. 
v. County of Los Angeles, 104 Cal.App. 235 [285 P. 896]; 
La Prade v. Department of Water & Power, 27 Cal.2d 47 
[162 P.2d 13]; ·cantren v. Board of Supervisors, 87 Cal.App. 
2d 471 [197 P.2d 218]; see Southern Cal. Jockey Club, 
Inc. v. Californ~ Etc. Racing Board, 36 Cai.2d 167 [223 
P .2d 1] .) 
Plaintiff cites Saks & Co. v. City of Beverly Hills, 107 
Cal.App.2d 260 [237 P.2d 32], where the attack was on 
revocation of a zoning ordinance variance by a city council, 
and the court ·said that where there is pleading and proof 
that a local board acted arbitrarily, capriciously or fraudu-
lently, the superior court will afford petitioner a trial de 
novo. If tl).at means that such a trial may be granted where 
the question presented is the precise one the local agency 
had authority to decide and did decide, it is contrary to the 
foregoing authorities and must be disapproved. In Mitchell 
v. Morris, 94 Cal.App.2d 446 [210 P.2d 857], a permit to 
erect a residence on a lot was denied because of lack of 
access. The sole question there presented was the consti-
tUtionality of 'the ordinance, and the' statement that the 
property owner must prove in court that his lot had ade-
~uate access in order to show, the city agency's action was 
arbitrary, is dictum. What the court meant was, that plain-
tiff must show th~t the agency had no basis for the denial 
of the permit wliich embr11ced the conclusion that the access 
was adequate. The primary point involved in the Saks case 
was whether a hearing was accorded petitioner. [Sa] But 
i:ri' ~ case' where a hearing is required and none is had, the 
proper procedure, as will be discussed later herein, is to 
remand the case to tlie local agency with directions to afford 
petitioner a hearing rather than a trial de novo. The true 
rule With respect to this problem was stated by this court 
in Bank of' America v. Mundo, supra, 37 Cal.2d 1, 5: "The 
question presente-d to the superior court in such an action 
is whether there was evidence of sufficient substantiality be-
fore the board to justify the :finding . . . and in the absence 
of fraud or malicious or arbitrary use of its powers the board 
is the· sole judge of questions of fact and of the values of 
property." That may mean in one sense that where there 
is no foundation fer the· agency's determination of the issue 
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it is authorized to decide, its determination will be annulled 
because it is capricious and arbitrary; the court, however, 
is confined to the matters considered by the agency. In an-
other sense it means that evidence may be introduced in court 
showing matters outside those before the agency when the 
record of the proceeding before the agency will not show 
such conduct on its part, such as fraud, or the denial of 
a proper hearing, if a hearing is required, etc. In those 
instances it must be contended that the agency acted arbi-
trarily, capriciously, fraudulently or maliciously. Even in 
those instances it may be necessary for the aggrieved person 
to present, if he can, such claims to the agency and make 
a record there, but we do not decide that question here. In 
the case at bar the precise issue, whether it be denominated 
law or fact or a mixture of the two, which the officers had , 
the authority to determine, was whether plaintiff's pro-
posed business would violate the law-whether it proposed 
to operate a game of chance. The evidence admitted at the 
trial was aimed at that same question, an issue upon which 
a trial de novo could not be had. Plaintiff and the trial court 
seemed to think that it could not be determined by the court 
whether the action by the officials was arbitrary or capricious \ 
unless the court took evidence on the issue decided by the 
officials. That view is wholly out of harmony with the prin-
ciples heretofore enumerated. If it were accepted there 
could be a trial de novo in every case. It would be the same 
as if on a review of a record on appeal on the ground of 
insufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's find-
ings, the appellate court would receive evidence to ascertain 
whether the trial court acted arbitrarily, without sufficient 
evidence. 
[4] Defendants assert, however, that the error, if any, 
was not prejudicial. It clearly was. As seen from the fore-
going discussion of the facts it is quite doubtful that the 
evidence is sufficient to support the court's finding that the 
officers had insufficient basis for their denial of the license, 
that the game was one of chance. In view of the result 
reached herein it is not necessary to pass upon that point. 
At the outset of the trial and several times thereafter 
when a discussion arose between counsel and court as to the 
admissibility of evidence on whether the game was one of 
chance, the court expressed the view hereinabove stated to 
be erroneous, that is, that such evidence was admissible to 
ascertain if the officers acted arbitrarily. For illustration, 
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when, at the beginning of the trial, the scope of the evi-
dence was under discussion the trial court said : ' ' There is 
not much question about the general principle of law but 
it seems to me in a case like this, you do have to take evi-
dence about the merits, although you are not trying an issue. 
It is not a trial de novo, but trying the issues whether or 
not the officers of the board used their discretion arbitrarily. 
You almost have to see what the facts are about the issues 
they decided; not that you can substitute yours for them, 
if they made an honest determination. You may not agree 
with them but if you see that they could have reasonably 
come to the conclusion, then you had better let it stand, but 
it would be the same thing for instance on a license that 
· should not be issued to anyone under twenty-one years of 
age, and the board refused on the ground that he was under 
twenty-one, that was their reason, and you come in here 
and they could show they made an investigation and follow-
ing their investigation, they showed that he was under twenty-
one, but if the other side wanted to produce evidence, they 
could show that he was over twenty-one. I think that evi-
dence should be in, in answer to the other side, and whether 
they would have changed their idea or decision if it was 
known.'' Similar remarks were made on other occasions 
and finally in its "Memorandum of Decision" the court said: 
''The question as to whether the game is .actually one of 
chance or skill, i.e., whether chance or skill predominates, 
is not a direct issue in this case. However I admitted evi-
dence of the nature of the game, including that of the two 
experts who testified on opposing sides, as I feel that, in 
determining whether a sufficient hearing or investigation was 
had before the administrative decision was arrived at, not 
only the testimony of the expert relied on would be relevant, 
but also the testimony of other experts which might have 
been available to the investigators. Were handwriting an 
issue before an administrative agency and were it determined 
on the testimony of a bank teller who said it was that of 
a certain person, should not a reviewing court admit testi-
mony of a Clark Sellers that the writing was not of that 
person in determining whether the evidence of the bank teller 
was substantial enough to support the decision of the ad-
ministrative agency T It was for this limited purpose that 
the evidence of the experts was admitted herein. . . . 
"For this reason I feel that the decision of the Chief of 
Police and the City Prosecutor was not at the time based on · 
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substantial evidence but, to that extent, was arbitrary. Their 
determination that chance predominates in this game may 
be right, in which case the penal laws are effectj.ve regard-
less of city license, particularly 335a Penal Cod~, and this 
is true as to Lite-0-Line and the other games which are no 
less games of chance than Fascination. If one is such, all 
are. (This does not apply to target shooting, throwing balls 
at bottles, or darts at balloons, ·etc.)." While that memo-
randum cannot control the findings of the court (it did not 
find whether the game was one of chance but did find the 
officers acted without sufficient basis), and it is ordinarily 
presumed that in a trial by the court without a jury the 
court based its findings only upon admissible evidence, the 
record demonstrates that the court's judgment was based to 
a considerable extent, if not chiefly, on the inadmissible evi-
dence. Hence, the error was prejudicial. 
The judgment must, therefore, be reversed but to avoid 
the possibility of error in disposing of the case on retrial, 
more must be said. There are two important questions re-
maining: (1) Whether plaintiff was entitled to a formal notice 
and hearing of its application for a license before the offi-
cers, and (2) if it was, but such hearing was not afforded, 
or, if it was not, and it is found that the officers had no 
sound basis for their determination, should the judgment of 
the court be to remand the matter to the officers or an order · 
for the issuance of the license 7 -
[3b] On the second question it is settled that where de-
terminative powers are vested in a local administrative age:J;J.cy 
and the court finds its decision lacks evidentiary basis, a hear-
ing was denied or it was otherwise erroneous, it is proper 
procedure to remand the matter to the agency .for .further 
and proper proceedings rather than for the court to decide 
the matter on the merits. (See Cason v. Glass .Bottle Blowers 
Assn., 37 CaL2d 134 [231 P .2d 6]; English v. City of Long 
Beach, 35 Cal.2d 155 [217 P.2d 22, 18 A.L.R.2d 547]; Steen 
v. City of Los .Angeles, 31 Cal.2d 542 [190 P.2d 937}; La 
Prade v. Department of Water & Power, supra, 27 Cal.2d 
47; Martin v. Board, of Supervisors, 135 Cal.App. 96 [26 
P .2d 843].) Plaintiff claims, ·however, that the officers were 
biased and prejudiced and it cannot obtain a . .fair and im-
partial decision from them. There is no finding to that effect, 
nor were they so .charged in the complaint. Indeed the trial 
court in its opinion states its b~lief that they acted honestly 
July 1952] FAsciNATION, INo. v. HooVER 
[39 C.2d 260; 246 P.2d 656] 
269 
and "in good :faith. It is not, therefore, a matter which will 
rtow be determined. 
[5] Under the circumstances presented a notice and hear-
ing were required. It will be recalled that section 6.100 
of the ordinance provides that when an application for a 
license is made to the tax collector he must refer it to desig-
nated officers in order that it may be 11 ascertained" whether 
or · not the proposed business would "comply with applicable 
laws and ordinances.'' If such officers give written notice 
to the collector that it will comply he must issue the license. 
If the officers reject the application because the business 
would violate the law the collector shall not issue the li~ense. 
In other words, the license must be granted unless there 
is found cause :for its denial. Manifestly it is contemplated 
that a factual or mixed factual and legal determination shall 
be made by the officers which is characteristic m the exer-
cise of a quasi judicial function. Marliln v. Board of Super-
visors, supra, 135 Cal.App. 96, is clearly analogous. There 
the county ordinance regulating the sale of beverages con-
taining above a certain percentage of alcohol, designated the 
board of supervisors as the licensing board for the issuance 
of licenses to sell beverages. A person desiring a license 
should apply in writing to the board giving such informa-
tion as the board prescribed. Upon receipt of the applica-
tion the board shall "investigate" and deny such applica-
tion i:f the applicant and the premises to be used :for his 
business would not conform to specified conditions. Plaintiff 
filed an application for a license which was denied by the 
board without notice or hearing. On mandamus the court 
directed the board to afford plaintiff a hearing, stating (p. 
100): "When a board of supervisors is charged by law with 
the duty of issuing licenses upon specified terms and condi-
tions, that tribunal becomes a quasi-judicial body for deter-
mining the facts aJ;id exercising sound and reasonable dis-
cretion in the performance of its duty. Since a board of 
supervisors is only a quasi-judicial body in its investigation 
and determination of the merits of petitions for licenses 
in conformity with the provisions of an ordinance, its hear-
ings may be somewhat informal and need not conform in all 
respects to the solemnity of a court proceeding. Neverthe-
less, the law does contemplate a fair and impartial hearing 
of an application :for a license with an opportunity for the 
petitione~ to present competent evidence for the considera-
tion of the board. (Reed v. · OoZlins, 5 Cal.App. 494 [~0 P. 
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973]; 33 C.J. 548, §§ 138-141.) By the great weight of 
authority, as appears from the text in 33 C.J., at page 548 : 
'One who has made an application for license is entitled 
to a hearing by the licensing authority.' On page 549 of 
the same volume it is further said: 'Where the hearing on 
an application for a license is held before a court, or before 
a board which acts in a judicial capacity, the proceedings 
are in the nature of a civil action and are governed by the 
ordinary rules of judicial procedure applicable thereto.' . . . 
It is true that an individual has no vested right to engage 
in the business of selling intoxicating liquor. (Ritz v. Light-
ston, 10 Cal.App. 685, 689 [103 P. 363] .) The regulation of 
that business is governed by legal principles different from 
those which apply to what may be termed inherently lawful 
avocations. While it is contended the ordinance which is 
involved in this proceeding purports to license only nonintoxi-
cating beverages, we are satisfied the interpretation of this 
act should be governed by the same rules which apply to 
the regulation of intoxicating drinks. A court may not take 
judicial notice of just what percentage of alcohol mingled 
with beer, ale or wine will necessarily intoxicate a particular 
individual, or just what quantity of the beverage will have 
that effect. (33 C.J. 498, sec. 17.) ... In spite of the fact 
that a vested right to engage in dispensing of these beverages 
may not exist, still the law contemplates a fair and impartial 
hearing of any application for a license which has been filed 
in strict conformity with the law. . .. It would be pre-
posterous to concede that any judicial tribunal could be 
clothed with the arbitrary power of issuing licenses and 
regulating business subject only to its own caprice; that 
with or without a hearing on the merits of the application, 
with or without reason, or upon ex parte statements or rumors, 
with no opportunity of refuting them, the board could grant 
or deny a petition for license. This is not the purpose or 
spirit with which regulatory statutes are enacted. Law con-
templates justice whether it is granted as a privilege or recog-
nized as a vested right. We therefore conclude that the 
right to engage in the sale of beverages under the ordinance 
of Lake County may not be arbitrarily denied by the Board 
of Supervisors without a hearing or an opportunity on the 
part of the petitioner to present the merits of her applica-
tion to the licensing tribunal." (See Reed v. Collins, 5 Cal. 
App. 494 [90 P. 973].) The Martin case has been cited 
with approval in cases involving the revocation of a license. 
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(People v. Noggle, 7 Cal.App.2d 14, 20 [45 P.2d 430]; Car-
roU v. California Horse Radtng Board, 16 Cal.2d 164 [105 
P.2d 110] ; Irvine v. State Board of Equalization, 40 Cal. 
App.2d 280, 285 [104 P.2d 847] ; Trans-Oceanic Oil Corp. v. 
Santa Barbara, 85 Cal.App.2d 776, 797 [194 P.2d 148] .) 
And it has been held that unless the statute expressly pro-
~ides to the contrary a license cannot be revoked without a 
hearing where the statute contemplates a quasi judicial de-
termination by the administrative agency that there be cause 
for the revocation; that because of reasons of justice and 
policy the statute will be interpreted to require a hearing. 
(Ratliff v. Lampton, 32 Cal.2d 226 [195 P.2d 792, 10 A.L.R. 
2d 826]; Carroll v. California Horse Racing Board, supra, 
16 Cal.2d 164; La Prade v. Department of Water & Power, 
supra, 27 Cal.2d 47; Covert v. State Board of Equalization, 
29 Cal.2d 125 [173 P.2d 545]; Steen v. Board of Cilvil Service 
Commrs., 26 Cal.2d 716 [160 P.2d 816] ; Bannerman v. Boyle, 
160 Cal. 197 [116 P. 732]; Welch v. Ware, 161 Cal. 641 [119 
P. 1080] ; Knights of Ku Klux Klan, Inc. v. Francis, 79 Cal. 
App. 383 [249 P. 539].) Other cases are in line with ,such 
statutory construction. (See, also, Lloyd Sabaudo Societa 
Anonima v. Elting, 287 U.S. 329, 336-337 [53 S.Ct. 167, 77 
L.Ed. 341] ; Corcoran v. Board of Aldermen of Cambridge, 
199 Mass. 5 [85 N.E. 155, 18 L.R.A.N.S. 187].) 
Reliance is placed on McDonough v. Goodcell, 13 Cal.2d 
741 [91 P.2d 1035, 123 A.L.R. 1205], where it was said that 
the Constitution does not require a hearing of an applica-
tion for a permit to engage in the bail bond business. Here, 
however, we are dealing with the interpretation of an ordi-
nance, not constitutional law. Mor'eover, in the McDonough 
case a hearing was afforded. 
There is some indication from the record that the visit 
to plaintiff's prospective place of business and the events 
that transpired there constituted a hearing or that a full 
hearing was waived. These are issues that will have to be 
ascertained on retrial. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
